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SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 5 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to your recent letter to the President of the Security Council on events following your report of 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629) on the issue of the confidence-building measures, upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter addressed to you by H.E. Mr. Glafcos Clerides, President of the Republic of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 54, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. SHAMBOS
Ambassador, Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Cyprus to the
United Nations

ANNEX

Letter dated 5 July 1994 from the President of Cyprus to the Secretary-General

I have received copy of your letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/785) in which you refer to the events following your report of 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629). In view of the fact that certain parts of the letter are likely to give the wrong impression of where we stand on the issue of the confidence-building measures, I would like to clarify once again our position:

1. The confidence-building measures were at first proposed in Cyprus on your behalf in March 1993 by your Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Feissel, and extensive proximity talks were held. Your Deputy Special Representative, as a result of the proximity talks, formed the impression that substantial progress was made and a meeting with you was arranged in New York in May 1993. At that meeting I accepted the proposed confidence-building measures. Mr. Denktash claimed that he had no authority from his "parliament" to accept them, and he asked for an adjournment of 15 days to return to Cyprus and to try to persuade his "parliament". Instead, as soon as he returned from New York, he spoke against the confidence-building measures both at his "parliament" and the Turkish National Assembly, and he failed to honour his commitment to return to New York.

2. In fact, it took about eight months for Mr. Denktash to respond before your representatives were able to commence proximity talks for seeking an agreement on the key issues relating to the modalities for the implementation of these measures.

3. After several meetings and discussions of both sides with your Special Representative Mr. Joe Clark, and the Deputy Special Representative Mr. Gustave Feissel, they produced a preliminary non-paper, which was discussed with both sides again and then on 21 March they tabled the document containing the proposed set of modalities which they urged us to accept, without raising any of our several reservations. They assured us that it would be the final document. In order to be constructive and helpful to the whole process, we went along and stated our acceptance on the condition that the Turkish Cypriot side would also accept this document. We, furthermore, stressed that we would not be willing to go beyond this document into further discussions of the confidence-building measures and the modalities for their implementation.

4. Your report, which was due to be issued at the end of March, was postponed until the end of April and was finally issued on 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629). Your report states clearly that your document of 21 March, which we accepted and the Turkish side rejected, was a balanced document.

5. We then observed a process being pursued which included meetings and discussions in Vienna in the presence of your Deputy Special Representative, in which Turkey was represented, Mr. Denktash was also represented and the Government of the United States of America, and although your good offices are

to assist the representatives of the two communities, the Greek Cypriot community was neither represented nor kept informed. Furthermore, the views of the Greek Cypriot side were not asked on what was agreed with the representative of Turkey and Mr. Denktash. These meetings did in fact involve discussions of changes to be effected on the balanced document of 21 March in order to make it acceptable to Mr. Denktash. Clearly, this process lay totally outside the scope of your good offices which are between the representatives of the two communities, under the auspices of the Secretary-General or his representatives.

6. Following the above, several more meetings were held, the content of which we were informed from the Turkish press, concluding in a set of changes that would have been put before us in the form of a letter. This we could not accept since we were neither present nor consulted, before agreement was reached with the Turkish side, in the agreement of these documents and we cannot be bound by them. With regard to reservations on the document of 21 March we had many, but we agreed not to raise them in order to facilitate progress. Furthermore, we cannot be bound by changes which have been agreed in our absence on the document of 21 March, which you yourself described as fair and balanced.

7. Characterizing the result of these discussions as clarifications is, I think, not the appropriate term, because major changes have indeed been made. For example, the change on the issue of access to Varosha creates a situation which psychologically does not create confidence to the people of Varosha that a safe access has been provided and as such the changes made cannot be considered as a clarification. It would be unrealistic to expect that the people of Varosha will be willing to return to their homes and properties while encircled all around by Turkish Forces, including from the side of the sea, and to be ready to invest $2 billion for rebuilding their city which was destroyed by the Turkish occupation forces. Similarly the reference to "Turkish Cypriot police" is in itself against the basic condition you placed at the outset of the process, namely, that nothing should be included in the agreement that would constitute the measures as a direct or indirect recognition. Signing an agreement, however, referring to the "TC police" is tantamount to recognizing the existence of a "state".

8. Consequently, although we remain committed to our acceptance of the document of 21 March, as I have repeatedly stated, and my Foreign Minister stressed during his meeting and included in the talking points handed to you, we are unwilling to move away from the balanced document of the United Nations of 21 March and adopt changes that are the result of consultations and talks to which we were not a party.

9. I am gravely concerned because, bearing in mind your reference in your report of 30 May in which you state that for several years there has been a display of lack of political will by the Turkish side, and your recommendations of several options, which clearly show that the major question to be considered is how the much-needed political will on the Turkish side can be created, I wonder whether the policy to accommodate Mr. Denktash's demands for changes of a fair and balanced United Nations document is giving the right message to him for the need to have political will.

10. My concern becomes even greater because during this recent period, several statements by Turkish officials show amply that the objective of Mr. Denktash in this whole exercise was nothing else than to try to shift the responsibility for failure from his shoulders while seeking recognition of his illegal regime. I wish, for the sake of the record, to list below some of the most prominent recent such statements:

(1) Mr. Denktash stated to the Kibris daily paper of 21 September 1993 the following:

"It is necessary to make a new evaluation. When we say federation we want recognition of our sovereignty and our territorial integrity".

(2) The President of Turkey, Mr. S. Demirel, stated to the illegal Bayrak Broadcasting Station on 3 June 1994 and on the 16 June 1994 the following:

(a) "Will the problem be solved if you put two different nations in a melting-pot, at a time when federations are being dissolved in the world?"

(b) "Today whether such a federal solution will be reached or not is being debated. The situation in Cyprus today is a solution in itself".

(3) Mr. Osman Ertug, "representative" in New York of the illegal entity in the occupied area, on 29 May 1994 stated the following:

"In reality of course there are two autonomous political entities in the island ultimately evolving into two independent states" (Speech, World Turkic Symposium, New York).

(4) Mr. Denktash stated to the illegal Bayrak Broadcasting Station on 10 May 1994:

"... it is impossible to establish a federation ..."

11. Let us therefore address ourselves to the real problem, which is none other than the lack of political will. If we at this time decide to ignore this fact, so boldly stressed by you in your report of 30 May 1994, we are missing the opportunity of facing for the first time the hard realities of why all the initiatives by you and your predecessors have failed.

12. We strongly believe and urge the Security Council that, in its endeavour to answer the question as to how they can help to build political will, the decision should be to start assessing the general situation and to enter into a consultation process for building an agenda of issues that should be considered and which would aim at creating the much-needed political will now lacking on the Turkish side. Such an agenda should include matters relating to security, demilitarization, the issue of settlers, basic principles, guarantees and any other such ideas that could be suggested. This process of discussions should proceed with the continued engagement of the Security Council, culminating in the holding of an international conference on Cyprus.

13. It would be detrimental to the effectiveness of all efforts if at this time we lose sight of the real issue before us and do not take a fresh approach and new initiatives that would help us and would open new possibilities for effectively trying to build political will on the Turkish side for a solution. Otherwise, we will be fuelling and facilitating Mr. Denktash's continued intransigence which, as numerous provocative statements made recently show, knows no bounds. Characteristically, speaking to the mass media recently, Mr. Denktash stated:

(a) "A federal solution in Cyprus is not possible any longer. He said that the United Nations Security Council was making a great error and bringing the two communities together by a superficial agreement would lead to an inevitable disaster". (Anatolia News Agency, 27 June 1994)

(b) "I urge all the sections of the Turkish Cypriot community to stand up with the TMT spirit" [T/C terrorist organization]. (Kibris, 25 June 1994)

14. In a few days 20 years will have been completed since the Turkish military invasion of 1974, with no prospect for a solution to the Cyprus problem in sight.

15. Bearing in mind this lack of progress towards a solution, one cannot but appreciate the great disappointment of the people of Cyprus who for 20 whole years have lived under the conditions of the continued occupation of 37 per cent of their land by the Turkish troops, which, contrary to all United Nations resolutions, instead of leaving Cyprus have been building up their strength, now estimated to be about 35,000 troops with an enormous military capacity, turning the occupied part of Cyprus, as you mention in your report, into one of the most highly militarized areas in the world.

16. During these 20 years of occupation one third of the population of Cyprus has continued to be prevented, by the Turkish occupation forces, from returning to their homes while at the same time the influx of illegal Turkish settlers continues unabated and, according to reports in the Turkish Cypriot press, have reached the staggering figure of over 90,000. Throughout these 20 years the people of Cyprus have also had to face the continuous provocations of Mr. Denktash supported by Ankara.

17. I hope that the Security Council will at long last want to address the key issue of the Cyprus problem which is the continued Turkish occupation and military build-up. This issue is undoubtedly the primary cause for the lack of political will which you have identified in your report as the reason for the failure of all efforts to date.

(Signed) Glafcos CLERIDES
President of the Republic of Cyprus